Anomaly Detection in Ethernet Networks Using Self Organising Maps by Mahapatra, Jyoti Ranjan & Mohanty, Jignyanshu
Anomaly Detection in Ethernet 
networks Using Self Organizing Maps 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 
Bachelor of Technology 
In 
Computer Science and Engineering 
 
 
By 
 
Jyoti Ranjan Mahapatra 
 
Jignyanshu Mohanty 
 
 
 
 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
National Institute of Technology 
Rourkela 
2009 
Anomaly Detection in Ethernet networks 
Using Self Organizing Maps 
 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 
Bachelor of Technology 
In 
Computer Science and Engineering 
 
By: 
 
Jyoti Ranjan Mahapatra 
Roll No.: 10506005 
 
Jignyanshu Mohanty 
Roll No.: 10506007 
 
 
Under The Guidance of: 
 
Prof. S.K.Jena 
 
 
 
 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
National Institute of Technology, Rourkela 
May, 2009 
  
National Institute of Technology 
Rourkela 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE 
 
 
 
 
This is to certify that the thesis entitled, “ANAMOLY DETECTION IN ETHERNET 
NETWORK USING SELF ORGANIZING MAP” submitted by Jyoti Ranjan Mahapatra 
and Jignyanshu Mohanty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of 
Bachelor of Technology Degree in Computer Science and Engineering at the National 
Institute of Technology, Rourkela (Deemed University) is an authentic work carried out 
by them under my supervision and guidance. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, the matter embodied in the thesis has not been submitted 
to any other university / institute for the award of any Degree or Diploma. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date:                 Prof S.K.Jena 
Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering 
                                              National Institute of Technology, Rourkela 
               Rourkela - 769008 
 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
We are sincerely thankful to Prof S.K.Jena, department of Computer Science and 
Engineering, NIT Rourkela for giving us the opportunity to work under him and lending 
every support possible at every stage of this project work. The level of flexibility offered 
by him in implementing the project work is highly applaudable. We would also like to 
thank Prof. K.Sathya Babu for extending his support during the entire duration of the 
project and giving us insights into the subject matter. 
 
We would also like to convey our sincerest gratitude and indebtedness to all other 
faculty members and staff of the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, NIT 
Rourkela, who bestowed their great effort and guidance at appropriate times without 
which it would have been very difficult on our part to finish the project work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date:        Jyoti Ranjan Mahapatra 
 
 
 
 
Date:        Jignyanshu Mohanty 
 
Abstract 
 
The network is a highly vulnerable venture for any organization that needs to have a set 
of computers for their work and needs to communicate among them. Any large 
organization that sets up a network needs a basic Ethernet or wireless framework for 
transferring data. Nevertheless the security concern of the organization creeps in and 
the computers storing the highly sensitive data need to be safeguarded. The threat to 
the network comes from the internal network as well as the external network. The 
amount of monitoring data generated in computer networks is enormous. Tools are 
needed to ease the work of system operators. Anomaly detection attempts to recognize 
abnormal behavior to detect intrusions. We have concentrated to design a prototype 
UNIX Anomaly Detection System. Neural Networks are tolerant of imprecise data and 
uncertain information. We worked to devise a tool for detecting such intrusions into the 
network. The tool uses the machine learning approaches ad clustering techniques like 
Self Organizing Map and compares it with the k-means approach. Our system is 
described for applying hierarchical unsupervised neural network to intrusion detection 
system. The network connection is characterized by six parameters and specified as a 
six dimensional vectors. The self organizing map creates a two dimensional lattice of 
neurons for network for each network service. During real time analysis, network 
features are fed to the neural network approaches and a winner is selected by finding a 
neuron that is closest in distance to it. The network is then classified as an intrusion if 
the distance is more than a preset threshold. The evaluation of this approach will be 
based on data sets provided by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) IDS evaluation in 1999. 
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1.1 Overview 
A secure computer network is one that assures data confidentiality, data and 
communications integrity and protection from denial of service (DOS) attacks 
[1].Confidentiality deals with the need to guard one’s private information, integrity 
mechanisms ensure that any change to any data must be done by authorized entities 
and through authorized mechanisms. Access control mechanisms are there that deal 
with protection against unauthorized access to data. A common approach to securing 
networks has been to control the flow of data in and out of the network. This approach, 
however was found to be impractical because it restricted user behavior, often required 
existing infrastructure to be discarded and was never really foolproof. 
 
This paradigm for securing computer networks was eventually replaced by the notion of 
intrusion detection [2]. Any set of actions that threaten the confidentiality and integrity of 
the network resource is termed an intrusion in a general sense. Intrusion detection 
basically monitors and analyses events occurring in a computer or network system in 
order to detect signs of security problems. The basic steps in the working of intrusion 
detection system can be categorized as: monitoring and analyzing traffic, identifying 
abnormal activities, raising alarm. It was accepted that attacks could not be prevented 
altogether, but given that an attack is detected early enough, it should be possible to 
successfully defend against it. Thus the role of an intrusion detection system became to 
flag suspicious behavior for further analysis by a human. Although this approach is not 
itself foolproof, it does not suffer from many of the disadvantages of the old approach. 
Although it suffers from the problems of False Positives (an event, incorrectly identified 
as an intrusion when none has occurred) and False negatives (an event that IDS fails to 
identify as an intrusion when one has in fact occurred). 
 
There are many types of intrusion detection systems, but most can be classified in one 
of two ways [1].  First, an intrusion detection system can be classified based on the data 
source that it uses. A host-based intrusion detection system uses the audit trails of the 
operating system as a primary data source. For                                                                                          
example, it may use records of user sessions to detect particular sessions that constitute 
an intrusion. A network-based intrusion detection system, on the other hand, uses 
network traffic information as its main data source. An example would be a system that 
uses TCP header information. 
 3 
 
An intrusion detection system can also be classified based on the intrusion detection 
technique that is used. There are two approaches in this regard: Signature based and 
Anomaly based. A rule or signature based system tries to identify behavior that is known 
to represent an attack. A signature is a set of rules pertaining to a typical intrusion 
activity. Since this technique looks for specific instances of abuse it is also known as 
misuse detection. Data mining techniques are used to record known intrusions in a 
database and referring to these patterns with incoming packets. An anomaly detection 
[2] system, on the other hand, tries to identify behavior that deviates from the normal [2]. 
A normal traffic pattern is first generated, threshold values are set for critical parameters 
chosen from among the network parameters. Whenever the traffic crosses any of these 
thresholds an alarm is raised. A problem with rule based systems is that they fail to 
identify novel attacks and may even miss known attacks if their signatures change [7]. 
Anomaly detection systems tend to suffer because normal behavior varies a lot and may 
change significantly over time, making the system less accurate. 
 
When analyzing any intrusion detection system, three factors must be considered: 
efficiency of the system, timeliness of detection and accuracy of detection [10]. Host 
based and network based systems are not always efficient because the amount of 
available monitoring data is often overwhelming. Timeliness of intrusion detection is 
critical as it allows action to be taken against any threat that is detected. Accuracy of 
intrusion detection is also important because a system that raises too many false alarms 
is simply impractical. When there is a large amount of data to process, timeliness 
deteriorates. On the other hand, with less data, accurate decisions about the nature of 
the behavior may not always be possible. 
 
The basic idea behind the system is that hierarchies of SOMs takes on a divide and 
conquer approach to concisely model the normal behavior of the system. Given the 
model of normal behavior, running data that corresponds to some suspicious behavior 
through the system will then exhibit some telltale signs that can be used to raise an 
alarm. 
 
In order to analyze and evaluate the current intrusion detection systems, MIT Lincoln 
Labs organized the DARPA 1998 Intrusion Detection Evaluation. Provided was TCP 
dump data generated over nine weeks by a simulated military local area network. It 
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contained normal traffic as well as attacks. This data was Processed into some seven 
million TCP connection records for use in The Third International Knowledge Discovery 
and Data Mining Tools Competition held in 1999 [4]. The system described herein is a 
network based anomaly detection system that uses this latter dataset. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basis for the system, the SOM. 
The process used in constructing the system is described in section 3. Section 4 
discusses the results of testing the system, section 5 discusses future work, and section 
6 states the conclusions that can be derived from this work. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
The major impetus for carrying out this project work and entering this area has been our 
summer internship at Glorytech, Bhubaneswar. The organization deals with the 
networking needs of the local vendors and we got an insight into how networks are 
organized. We got to work on static firewalls to safeguard the networks. We studied AI 
and machine learning in 6th semester and that led us to think about implementing 
clustering approaches to network traffic data to make a anomaly detection tool that 
would use machine learning to configure itself and observe patterns among network 
traffic. This area has been taken up by researchers and various means suggested to do 
the implementation. We took the SOM architecture to implement our tool because of its 
efficiency. 
 
 
1.3 Objectives 
 To build a neural network model to implement Self Organizing Map. 
 To implement a means to extract network parameters from network traffic. 
 To provide a way to implement the SOM algorithm on the extracted features. 
 To provide a way to calibrate the results with normal traffic and identify 
attacks as anomalous. 
 Compare with K-means approach. 
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Myriads of clustering approaches have been devised by researchers in order to 
implement machine learning algorithms. Our work concentrated on the study of the Self 
Organizing Maps (SOM) and the K-means approach. These two approaches were 
extensively studied and compared. This section deals with the basics of the two 
approaches and their advantages and disadvantages over each other. The reason of 
using SOM over K-means is described. 
 
2.1 Self Organizing Maps (SOM) 
The concept, design, and implementation techniques of Self-Organizing Maps are 
described in detail in [11]. The algorithm converts non-linear statistical relationships 
between data points in a high-dimensional space into geometrical relationships between 
points in a two-dimensional map, called the Self-Organizing Map (SOM). A SOM can 
then be used to visualize the abstractions (clustering) of data points in the input space. 
The points in the SOM are called neurons, and are represented as multidimensional 
vectors. If the data points in the input space are characterized using k parameters and 
represented by k-dimensional vectors, the neurons in the SOM are also specified as k-
dimensional vectors. The SOM is an unsupervised neural network algorithm that uses 
competitive learning [6]. Competitive learning means that as data is input to the SOM, 
there is a competition among the neurons or nodes of the map to determine which 
neurons will represent the input data. In the case of the SOM, the winning neuron is the 
neuron most similar to the input data, and it is affected by becoming more like the input 
data. In this way, neurons in the map become specialized to represent different sets of 
data in the input space. 
 
The SOM consists of a two dimensional grid of neurons. Each neuron is represented by 
a prototype vector of weights whose dimension is equal to that of the input data. 
Associated with each neuron is a neighborhood relation. This relation dictates the map’s 
topology, or who the neighbors of a neuron are. Based on the topology, distance in the 
map can be defined. For example, the nodes adjacent (directly connected) to a given 
neuron are within a radius of one from that neuron. 
One important property of the SOM is that it provides a topology preserving mapping 
from the input space to the two dimensional grid of nodes [5]. This means that points 
that are close in the input space are mapped to units that are close in the output space. 
The steps of the SOM follow. 
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2.1.1 Learning 
In the SOM Learning phase, the neurons in the SOM are trained to model the 
input space. This phase has the following two important characteristics: 
– Competitive. Each sample data point from the input data space is shown in parallel to 
all the neurons in the SOM, and the “winner” is chosen to be the neuron that responds 
best. The k-dimensional values of the winner are adjusted so that it responds even 
better to similar input. 
– Cooperative. A neighborhood is defined for the winner to include all neurons in its 
near vicinity in the SOM. The k-dimensional values of neurons in the neighborhood are 
also adjusted so that they too respond better to a similar input. 
 
2.1.2 Distance Measure  
For the purpose of locating the winner neuron given the data sample, a suitable measure 
of distance has to be defined. The commonly used distance measures are the Euclidean 
and the Dot-product measures. In the Euclidean measure, given two points X (x1, x2, . . ., 
xk) and Y (y1, y2, . . ., yk) in k-dimensional space, the Euclidean distance is given by 
 
√((x1-y1)
2 + (x2-y2)
2+..+(xk-yk)
2) 
If the Dot-product measure is to be used, the input data points and the neurons in the 
SOM have to be normalized. Normalization of a vector V (v1, v2, . . .,vk) is a process of 
transforming its components into 
 
(v1/√ v1
2+ v2
2+..+ vk
2  ,  v1/√ v1
2+ v2
2+..+ vk
2,…. , v1/√ v1
2+ v2
2+..+ vk
2) 
 
so that the modulus of the normalized vector is unity. The dot-product of the input data 
point is calculated individually with each of the neurons, where the dot-product of two 
normalized vectors X (x1, x2, . . ., xk) and Y (y1, y2, . . ., yk) is defined to be 
 
x1.y1 + x2.y2 + . . . + xk.yk 
 
The winner is selected to be the neuron that gives the maximum dot product. 
Training of the map is done by feeding individual patterns to the map [3].  When a 
training pattern x is shown to map, it is compared the all the prototype vectors in the map 
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using some distance measure d. This is often just the Euclidean distance. The best 
matching unit  BMU is then defined to be a prototype vector mc such that 
 
d(x,mc)  =  min i d(x,mi) 
 
where i iterates over all the nodes in the map. Once the BMU is found, each node mi in 
the map is updated via the update rule 
 
mi(t+1)  =  mi(t)  +  hci(t) [ x - mi(t) ] 
where mi(t), mi(t+1) represent k-dimensional values of neuron i, at time t and t + 1 
respectively; x(t) represents the k-dimensional values of the sample data(input pattern), t 
is the point in time, and hci a time-variable non-increasing  neighborhood function about 
mc.  
 
2.1.3 Neighborhood Function 
 The commonly used neighborhood functions are Gaussian and Bubble. In the Bubble 
function, the neighborhood radius is specified by a variable σ, and all neurons within the 
neighborhood are adjusted by the same factor α towards the winner. The parameter α, 
called the learning rate factor, and the neighborhood size σ, are generally chosen to be 
monotonically decreasing functions of time t, where t is a discrete time measure 
incremented with every iteration of the training process. 
The Bubble neighborhood function hci(t) is specified as: 
 
hci (t) = { α(t)  ,||rc, ri|| < σ(t) 
      0  , otherwise 
 
The Gaussian neighborhood function adjusts the winner neuron the most towards the 
sample data, and adjusts the remaining neurons within the neighborhood lesser and 
lesser as their distance from the winner increases, based on a bell shaped Gaussian 
function. It is specified as: 
 
 
hci (t) ={ α(t) exp (−||rc,ri||
2 /2σ2 (t))  , ||rc, ri|| < σ(t) 
         0      ,otherwise 
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Here α is the learning rate. It is set to a high value early on in the training to produce a 
rough training phase and then decreases with time to fine-tune the training. The function 
exp (−||rc,ri||
2 /2σ2 (t)) serves the purpose by defining the radius about mc beyond which 
nodes in the map are not significantly affected by the input pattern x. This radius also 
tends to decrease over time. Figure 1 shows the basic SOM training algorithm. The map 
shown is a 3×4 map with a one-dimensional input space. A pattern with scalar value 6.4 
is fed to the map. It is compared to all the nodes in the map using the Euclidean 
distance. and is found to be most similar to the node weighed 6. The example shows the 
case where the winning node and its immediate neighbors (shown in bold) are updated 
to reflect the input pattern more closely. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: SOM training algorithm 
 
 
To summarize, for every neuron in the SOM, the learning function calculates 
its distance from the sample data, and adjusts its k-dimensional values towards 
the sample data by a factor specified by the neighborhood function hci (t). 
Since the SOM is often used on high dimensional data, it is often difficult to visualize 
exactly what a map may look like. Several projection techniques have been developed. 
These aim to reduce the dimension of the vectors in the map while maintaining their 
relationships. Another way of visualizing an SOM is through a united matrix, a 
representation that shows distances between adjacent nodes using color. 
 
The SOM is a useful analysis and visualization tool. It is capable of representing the 
features of an underlying dataset in a concise manner. In the context of an intrusion 
detection system, the SOM can be used as a concise model of the normal behavior on 
the network. 
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2.2    K-Means Clustering 
 
Yet another method to analyze anomalous and normal traffic data is the K-means 
approach. The resulting cluster centroids are then used for fast anomaly detection in 
monitoring data. K-means clustering [12] is a clustering analysis algorithm that groups 
objects based on their feature values into K disjoint clusters. Objects that are classified 
into the same cluster have similar feature values. K is a positive integer number 
specifying the number of clusters, and has to be given in advance. Here are the four 
steps of the K-means clustering algorithm: 
 Define the number of clusters K. 
 Initialize the k cluster centroids. This can be done by arbitrarily dividing all objects 
into k-clusters, computing their centroids and verifying that all centroids are 
different from each other. Alternatively the centroids can be initialized to K 
arbitrarily chosen, different objects. 
 Iterate over the objects and compute the distances to the centroids of all clusters. 
Assign each object to the cluster with the nearest centroid. 
 Recalculate the centroids of both modified clusters taking learning rate into 
consideration. 
 Repeat step 3 until the centroids do not change any more. 
 
A distance function is required in order to compute the distance (i.e. similarity) between 
two objects. The most commonly used distance function is the Euclidean one which is 
defined as: 
 
d(x, y) =√∑(xi – yi)2 
 
where x = (x1,…., xm) and y = (y1… ym) are two input vectors with m quantitative features. 
In the Euclidean distance function, all features contribute equally to the function value. 
However, since different features are usually measured with different metrics or at 
different scales, they must be normalized 
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before applying the distance function. The recalculation of centroids is based on the 
formula: 
 
mnew  =  mold + η(xt  - mold  ) 
 
where η is a small positive learning rate. 
An alternative to Euclidean distance is the Mahalanobis distance function that uses the 
inverse covariance matrix S-1 to reflect statistical correlations between different features: 
 
d(x, y) = q(x - y) T S-1 (x - y) 
 
However, calculating and inverting the covariance matrix is computationally demanding 
for feature vectors with a large number of dimensions.  
K-means clustering algorithm can be applied to training datasets which may contain 
normal and anomalous traffic without being labeled as such in advance. The rationale 
behind this approach is the assumption that normal and anomalous traffic form different 
clusters in the features space. Of course, the data may contain outliers which do not 
belong to a bigger cluster, yet this does not disturb the K-means clustering process as 
long as the number of outliers is small. As already mentioned, the clustering is done 
individually for the predefined services, 
identified by their typical (protocol, port) pair, as well as for the default classes that cover 
the remaining flows distinguished by the protocol value only. 
 
The clustering algorithm divides the training data into K clusters, but does not determine 
if a cluster reflect time intervals of normal or anomalous traffic. This decision has to be 
made manually or by heuristics. For example, a higher 
average in the number of packets can be taken as an indicator for an anomalous cluster. 
It may occur that clusters are very close to each other. This can have several reasons: 
Either the number of clusters K has been badly chosen or the training data is very 
homogeneous, e.g. because it does not contain any anomalous traffic or because the 
anomalous traffic looks very similar to normal traffic. Nevertheless, the cluster centroids 
can still be used for outlier detection. 
An essential problem of the K-means clustering method is to define an appropriate 
number of clusters K. As initial value, we chose K = 2, assuming that normal and 
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anomalous traffic in the training data form two different clusters. Obviously, a different 
number of clusters may result in better clusters, e.g. if the considered service already 
shows distinct periods of very low and very high traffic volume under normal conditions. 
Classification and Outlier Detection 
The K-means clustering process results in cluster centroids for normal and anomalous 
traffic which can be used to detect anomalies in new flow records monitored in the same 
network. New flow records have to be preprocessed and transformed like the training 
data in order to obtain the same features. For the purpose of anomaly detection, there 
are two distance based methods -classification and outlier detection, that both use the K-
means clustering results and that can be applied individually or in a combined way. 
 
Classification 
 The distances to the cluster centroids of the corresponding traffic class are calculated 
using the weighted Euclidean distance function. An object is classified as normal if it is 
closer to the normal cluster centroid than to the anomalous one, and vice versa. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2(b) with a two-dimensional feature space: Object P is closer to the 
normal cluster, therefore P is normal. This distance-based classification allows detecting 
known kinds of anomalies, i.e. anomalous traffic with similar characteristics as in the 
training datasets. 
 
Outlier detection  
An outlier is an object that differs from most other objects significantly. Therefore it can 
be considered as an anomaly. For outlier detection, only the distance to the appropriate 
centroid of the normal cluster is calculated. If the distance between an object and the 
centroid is larger than a predefined threshold dmax, the object is treated as an outlier and 
anomaly. This is depicted in Figure 2(c) where P2 and P3 lie outside the dmax circle. In 
contrast to the classification method, outlier detection does not make use of the 
anomalous cluster centroid, i.e. it may be less accurate in detecting known kinds of 
anomalies. On the other hand, it allows detecting new anomalies that do not appear in 
the training datasets.  
 
Combined classification and outlier detection 
Classification and outlier detection can be used in a combined way in order to overcome 
the limitations of each individual method. If the two methods are applied simultaneously, 
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an object is treated as an anomaly if it is closer to the anomalous cluster centroid than to 
the normal one, or if its distance to the normal cluster centroid is larger than the 
predefined threshold. In figure 4, for example, both objects P1 and P2 are regarded as 
anomalies. P1 is closer to the anomalous cluster and P2’s distance to the normal group 
is larger than the threshold dmax. 
  
  (a)   
  
  (b) 
 
  (c) 
Figure 2: K-means algorithm (a) Finding nearest neighbor  (b) Finding dmax  
(c)  Labeling P1 normal and P2 anomalous,  
based on euclidean distance 
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2.3 Reasons for using SOM implementation over K-means 
approach 
 
Authors are ambiguous over which is the best method for implementing the anomaly 
detection technique. Some support the SOM approach and some favor the k-means 
approach. But one major area of concern is not the difficulty of run time complexity but 
the difficulty of implementing it over dataset. The k-means approach needs a mean 
centroid to be defined at the outset of the run. But network traffic data is variable and 
deviates randomly over time. So, any randomly generated initial mean value is difficult to 
implement on variable network traffic. On the other hand SOM learns itself according to 
given data. Also k-means approach suffers from the problem of local optima. As the 
initial centroid value and number of clusters is chosen, it might be away from the optimal 
centroids and the end result for SOM is better than k-means. Search space is better 
explored by SOM. This is due to the effect of the neighborhood parameter which forces 
units to move according to each other in the early stages of the process. K-means 
gradient orientation forces a premature convergence which, depending on the 
initialization, may frequently yield local optimum solutions. 
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3.1 Dataset 
The dataset available for constructing the system consisted of nearly five million 
connections of labeled training data and two million connections of test data. The 
connections were in chronological order. Each connection was described by 41 features. 
The features can be categorized as follows [7] 
 
Basic TCP features: These features include the duration, protocol type, and service of 
the connection, as well as the amount of data transferred. 
 
Content features: These features were derived from the payload of the TCP packets 
using domain knowledge. They include features like the number of failed login attempts 
and whether or not root access was obtained. 
 
Time based traffic features: Calculated over a two second time interval, these features 
include things like the number of connections to the same host as the current connection 
and the number of connections to the same service as the current connection. 
 
Host based traffic features: Analogous to the time based traffic features, host based 
traffic features are derived over the past 100 connections. They are meant to catch 
attacks that span longer than two seconds.  
 
A connection in the training data was either a normal connection or was one of 24 
different attack types. Each connection was either normal or fell into one of the following 
categories of attacks. 
 
Remote-to-Local: The intruder attempts to gain unauthorized access from a remote 
machine. For example, this may involve guessing a password. 
 
User-to-Root: The intruder tries to access the superuser account by using for example, 
some form of buffer overflow. 
Denial-of-Service: The intruder attempts to reduce the performance of a host, possibly 
going as far as making the host unavailable. 
 
Probing: The intruder attempts to gather information about the host. 
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From the available features, six were selected for use in the system. All six were basic 
TCP features. There were two main reasons for this. First, selecting more features would 
have made the task of training the system computationally infeasible given the available 
time. Second, there was interest in determining just how far an entirely data driven 
machine learning paradigm could be pushed, and most of the other features were based 
on a priori knowledge [9]. Also, with the pure data driven approach, it is possible that 
some of the other features and the relations between them may in fact be learned by the 
system. 
 
The selected features were: 
 
Duration: The length (in seconds) of the connection. 
Protocol type: The protocol of the connection, such as TCP or UDP. 
Service: The service accessed by the connection, such as HTTP or Telnet. 
Flag: The status flag of the connection. 
Destination bytes: The amount of data sent by the destination of the connection. 
Source bytes: The amount of data sent by the source of the connection. 
 
Three of these features: duration, destination bytes, and source bytes, had continuous 
values. Protocol type, service, and flag all had discrete values. 
 
It should be noted that the entire dataset consisting of the seven million connections was 
not used in constructing the system. Only a 10% dataset from among the connection 
was used in order to make the training computationally feasible and most traffic has a 
typical pattern. Capturing the pattern of the traffic once is sufficient than doing it 
repeatedly. The 10% dataset represented the whole traffic connection for the training 
purpose.  
The dataset was extracted from the KDD Cup dataset which consisted of tcpdump data 
of DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation [4].This represents TCP dump data generated 
over nine weeks of simulated network traffic in a hypothetical military local area network. 
This data was processed into some 7 million TCP connection records for use in the 3rd 
International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition in 1999 [4]. 
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3.2 SOM Architecture 
A SOM architecture with a single level was used [2].Such an architecture was shown to 
be effective for the purpose of intrusion detection. The algorithm was fed with the six 
parameters chosen, connection duration, protocol type, service, flag, destination byte, 
source byte. 
 
The data was preprocessed to get into a form that was program readable. The extract 
the tcpdump data a network sniffer was used. The sniffer was placed on a central hub 
through which all traffic is routed so that it can capture all packets in promiscuous mode.  
Using this program on a Personal computer would lead to suboptimal results as it has 
slow network adapter and low buffer space. This sniffer can only be used on a dedicated 
server. For our purpose the standard dataset of DARPA IDS was used. It is a static 
dataset and used to standardize the algorithm for use on a more dynamic traffic data.  
 
 
Figure 3: Data Flow in SOM 
 
The single level map model the behavior of the computer network with respect time and 
given feature. Here, time does not refer to explicit points in time when values are 
observed to occur, but rather to the relative ordering and frequency of the values. Based 
on the output of the map, the network administrator should be able to decide whether or 
not a particular connection is an attack. 
 
3.3 Data Preprocessing For Training the SOM 
 
The first step in preprocessing the data involved removing all the attack connections 
from the training dataset, leaving only the normal ones. Care was taken to preserve 
chronological order. The conjecture was that by training the maps on patterns that 
corresponded to normal network behavior, the hierarchy of maps would model this 
normal behavior. Within each map, the majority of the prototype vectors would be similar 
to patterns that correspond to normal behavior on the network. These would fall within 
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dense regions of the map. However, as the map expands and contracts to represent the 
input data, it would have to stretch across regions that do not correspond to normal 
behavior and may isolate regions. These would then be sparse regions in the map. If a 
pattern would excite a node in one of these latter regions, it could then be considered 
abnormal and tagged as an attack. 
 
The original dataset consisted of a comma delimited file where each line in the file 
corresponded to one connection. The second step in preprocessing the data involved 
extracting each feature from this file. This resulted in a sequence of feature values, one 
per feature. For example, when the duration feature was extracted, the result was a 
sequence of durations.  
 
Next, because three of the six features consisted of discrete string values, a format that 
cannot be fed directly into the SOM, these features had to be enumerated. Basically, this 
involved iterating over the sequence, replacing each discrete value by an integer. If a 
discrete value did not map to any integer (i.e. was not seen before), it was mapped to 
the next lowest available integer. 
 
The result of the extraction and enumeration was six sequences of numbers, with each 
sequence corresponding to a feature. The nth entry in all of these sequences 
corresponded to the six features for the nth connection in the dataset. 
 
As is, if the values in each sequence were fed to the maps, no temporal relationship 
would have been encoded. In order to encode ordering and frequency relationships in 
the patterns that the maps would see, a first-in-first-out FIFO buffer was used [8]. For a 
buffer of size n, the basic form of this algorithm takes the following form: 
 
1. The values of the sequence are fed into the buffer in chronological order. 
2. Once the n positions of the buffer are filled, a pattern is generated. 
3. When the next value in the sequence is observed, the oldest value currently in     the 
buffer is discarded, the remaining values in the buffer shift by one so that the vacated 
position is filled and the next value is placed in the empty location. This generates the 
next pattern. 
 
 20 
 
This algorithm was applied to each sequence. In this way, temporal information, be it 
only the relative order of values, was implicitly encoded in the patterns. This is important 
because often an attack may not be identified based solely on the features of one TCP 
connection, but on that of several, successive, TCP connections. For example, a DOS 
attack may consist of several successive connections with a specific value for a 
particular feature. In addition, features similar to the host based traffic features may 
become visible to the map because the information that the map sees spans many 
connections. 
 
The result of this preprocessing stage was six sets of twenty dimensional patterns, one 
for each feature, generated from normal connections. 
 
3.4 Training The SOM 
 
The map was trained on a block of 15000 consecutive connections, a fraction of the total 
dataset available after the first preprocessing stage. Although training on more patterns 
would allow the system to model a wider range of normal behavior, it would make the 
training of the maps difficult given the available timeline. The maps were trained using C 
. The result was a 10×10 map. Training uses all the mathematical calculations as 
described in chapter 2. For an input pattern given to the map, its distance to each 
mapping unit is found out. This distance was then normalized. In this way patterns close 
to map units yield a normalized distance close to one, and patterns far away from it yield 
a normalized distance close to zero. 
 
This normalization was done so that the values for all the features would have the same 
range. Otherwise, certain features would dominate the distance measure used in 
training, and thus the training of the map, simply because they had a larger range and 
not necessarily because they were more significant. 
 
For each pattern, the normalized distance to each center in the map was recorded, 
resulting in a six dimensional vector for each map. The vectors for all the maps were 
then concatenated to form one vector of dimension 100. 
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3.5 Calibrating The Code book vectors 
 
 
The Code book vectors were calibrated with carefully selected input patterns so that 
attack patterns are not there. These normal input data patterns map to some of the 
mapping units and these mapping units are labeled as normal So the code book entries 
represent the anomalous as well as the normal patterns and are labeled. During testing 
any pattern that doesn’t match to these units are termed anomalous and an alarm is 
raised. 
 
 
3.6 Running the dataset referring  with code book vector  
 
 
The dump file from KDD dataset is run referring the code book vectors and the output is 
generated along with labels signifying which input patterns were termed as anomalous. 
The false positive and false negative rates are calculated based on the output type, 
whether it’s anomalous or not, and the input pattern, whether it was actually an attack 
packet. 
 
3.7 System Architecture  Overview 
 
Figure 4: Proposed Architecture 
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The algorithm was run on the test dataset and according to the proposed architecture. 
First the test data was preprocessed, the SOM was trained with training data, the code 
book entries were labeled by calibrating with normal connections and then the resulting 
code book entries were used for running the algorithm. 
Using the SOM implementation the following results were obtained. 
 
• Dimension of grid used : 10*10 
• Samples Taken for training : 15000 
• Samples taken for testing : 13,500 
• Attacks detected : teardrop, portsweep, ipsweep, backdoor, nmap, 
neptune, satan, phf, warezmaster 
• Attacks not detected : pod, buffer_overflow, guess_passwd, imap, 
ftp_write, toolkit 
• Dataset : KDD 10% unlabelled training dataset and 10% labeled testing 
dataset 
• False Positive rate = 2/13500 = 1.07 % 
• False negative rate = 145/13500 = 0.015 % 
 
The efficiency of the anomaly detection tool is reflected from the false positive rate, false 
negative rate and the number of attacks that were detected. In this tool false positive 
rate was found to be very low. On the other hand in the small dataset taken, false 
negative rate was also found to be low. But the system is inefficient because a number 
of attacks were not detected: pod, buffer_overflow, guess_passwd, imap, ftp_write, 
toolkit. The low level of false negative rate was due to the reason that these are not 
denial of service type of attacks and the six parameters we chose for implementing the 
algorithm were identical in all respects for these attack packets and the normal packets. 
As these packets are encountered less in number in the traffic, the numerator value in 
calculation becomes small, and hence the low false negative rate. 
A major analysis would be around the detection of the mapping units of the 10×10 grid. 
The points of the grid where most normal packets match (in other words the frequency 
with which the packets map to particular grid units). Figure shows how many times each 
node in the top level map was the BMU for the normal training data (the 15000 patterns 
used to train the map). Clearly, some nodes are BMUs more frequently than others, but 
most nodes receive their fair share of hits. However, nodes 10, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
38, 48, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 79, 80, 89, 90, 99, 100 stand out because 
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they receive relatively few hits. Thus, these nodes could be considered to be associated 
with abnormal behavior. 
 
 
frequency 
     
Node number 
Figure 5: Hits per node of normal training data 
 
One rule for labeling a connection as an attack might then be to check these BMUs, and 
if they are all identified nodes, label that connection as an attack. Otherwise, the 
connection would be considered normal. Testing of the system was performed on 
roughly 0.1% of the total available test dataset without regard to the attack types. 
The number of false positives and false negatives was calculated. A false positive was 
defined to be a normal connection that was identified as an attack. A false negative was 
defined to be an attack connection that was not detected. Thus, false positives measure 
the false alarm rate while false negatives measure the detection rate. Using the rule 
stated above, the false positive rate was found to be about 1.07 % while the false 
negative rate was roughly 0.015 %. A false positive rate above one percent presents a 
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problem because then the network administrator is forced to check the over one in a 
hundred connections that are tagged. On a busy network, this number becomes 
unmanageable rendering the system useless. The false positive rate of 1.07 % can be 
attributed to the fact that anomalous nodes are BMUs frequently in the normal data as 
well. 
 
The performance of this system is comparable to that of the systems participating in the 
DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation 1999. The best system in the evaluation had an 
overall false negative rate of about 0.33 and an overall false positive rate of 0.0002. This 
system used all the available TCP connection features, and was trained on the entire 
available training data set. Given that the system presented in this paper used only a 
fraction of this information its performance is solid. 
Number of Connections Used  Fraction of Total 
Training SOM   15000     0.05 
Labeling SOM  494021    0.1 
Testing SOM   311029    0.1 
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The project presented in this paper opens up many avenues for future work. For 
example, many decisions made during the development of the system were made with 
little deliberation due to time constraints. Should more resources be available, the 
following issues could be revisited. 
 
 The current system was based on six basic TCP connection features. The result 
of adding more features or changing the features that are used could be 
explored in more detail. 
  Only about 0.5 % of the total available training dataset was used. The system 
should be trained on the full training dataset. 
 The FIFO buffer algorithm is an important part of the system. Experimentation 
could be performed on the size and sampling rate of the algorithm. 
  Testing of the system was done on about 10 % of the test dataset. Testing of 
the system should be based on the full test dataset, and with regard for the 
different attack types. 
  There are different sequences of BMUs that could define when an attack 
situation is taking place with each definition resulting in different performance. 
The definitions that were examined were only heuristics and were fairly arbitrary. 
Other such rules could be explored to see if they catch more attack cases while 
raising fewer false alarms. 
 
The system could also be expanded in order to determine if its performance could be 
improved. For example, another level could be added to the existing SOM architecture. 
This level would only see patterns that were considered suspicious by the current single  
level map. Since this new level would see only a fraction of the connections that the 
lower levels see, it may be able to make a better distinction between normal and attack 
patterns compared to the heuristic used in obtaining the results. The additional level in 
the architecture would also make the manual analysis of the results and definition of 
attack situations based on BMU sequences unnecessary. 
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An unsupervised anomaly detection system is one that does not require any data to be 
labeled [6]. The benefit of such a system is that it does not require the labeling of the 
training dataset for each deployment of the system into a new environment. As is 
although it uses an unsupervised machine learning technique, the current system is not 
an unsupervised anomaly detection system in the sense because labels were needed to 
partition the training dataset. Another area of future work would therefore be to transform 
the system into a genuine unsupervised anomaly detection system. 
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A network based anomaly detection system that uses a hierarchy of SOMs was 
presented. The dataset used in the system was derived from that used in the DARPA 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation. The hierarchy consisted of one level.  Once the 
description of the system was given, rules for identifying intrusions were presented. 
Using these rules the system was found to detect just over 60% of the attacks with a 
manageable rate of false alarms.  
 
Although the results of this work should be interpreted with caution it is suggested that 
the system presented performs comparably to some of the better systems that took part 
in the DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation. The system was not tested on the full test 
dataset, meaning that it may not have encountered some of the more difficult attacks but 
it was also never trained on the full training dataset, meaning that it may not have had a 
chance to learn the full range of normal behavior. 
 
In addition the system was for the most part entirely data driven. The work presented in 
this paper is still preliminary and there are many areas where the outlined system could 
be improved upon. However it has been worthwhile because it not only validates the 
results of previous work on SOMs and intrusion detection but it suggests that the 
approach may eventually lead to a system that provides timely and accurate results with 
a high level of efficiency.  Although the work did not produce an intrusion detection 
system that could be successfully. 
 
Deployed on real networks a promising start towards that goal was made. The fact that 
there are so many areas in the system that could be further investigated is also 
encouraging because it means that there is plenty of room for improvement. 
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